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Abstract
The new South African constitution commits the
government to guarantee "basic health services "for
every child under 18. Primary health care for
pregnant women and children under six and elements
of essential primary health care have received
priority. At present, there is little analysis of the moral
considerations involved in making choices about more
advanced or costly health care which may, arguably,
also be "basic". This paper illustrates some of the
tensions in setting priorities for a just macro-
allocation of children's health care, given the realities
of need and scarce resources, and the commitment to
equality of basic opportunities.
(journal ofMedical Ethics 1998;24:268-273)
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Introduction
An intractable problem facing the transformation
process in South Africa is macro-allocation of
health care resources. Just priority-setting (rank-
ing) decisions in health care provision have to be
made which will inevitably require rationing
health care, given extreme health care need and
scarcity of resources, and social and political con-
straints.
How can macro-allocation, especially of health
care services which go beyond a bare minimum,
be done in a rational way rather than by status quo
default? This paper illustrates some tensions for
public policy if it is to achieve or approximate this
goal.
Certain realities form the background to any
rational discussion of these tensions. First, South
Africa has a mixed public/private health care sys-
tem in which the public sector plays an indispen-
sable coordinating and material role. Less than
one quarter ofthe population has regular access to
private-sector health services.' Second, the na-
tional budget's health care resource allocation has
to be balanced against other public commitments
to improve health, such as the provision of
housing, sanitation, electrification, clean water,
and education. And, third, given additional, alter-
native sources of finance (such as social health
insurance, combined with increased user fees for
insured patients at public-sector hospitals), South
Africa ought to be able to afford public health care
services beyond primary health care and
prevention.'
We focus on children, for several reasons. Chil-
dren are particularly vulnerable, but they also have
opportunities for wellbeing of a uniquely founda-
tional kind, which are unlikely to recur in the same
way in later life. Directing resources to the devel-
opment of children's potential is therefore an
investment with a high social return. A society that
fails to show an adequate commitment to
children's health might have an even weaker com-
mitment to the health of other age cohorts. Con-
sequently, if basic health care services are denied
children, it might be even more difficult to make a
case for those services being provided to other
groups.
Children's rights and public policy
The South African government has confirmed its
priority commitment to children. A justiciable Bill
of Rights in the new constitution includes a clause
which entitles every child under 18 to basic nutri-
tion, shelter, basic health services, and social
services.3 In June 1995, the government ratified
the 1989 United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child with far-reaching implications
for children's health.4 5 To help ensure that
children's rights do not remain manifesto rights,
South Africa published a national plan of action
using the convention, the goals of the 1990 World
Summit for Children,6 and a reconstruction and
development programme as a framework. Child
health and nutrition are priorities of the action
plan, and targets have been set that will produce a
drastic reduction in infant mortality and malnutri-
tion among children under six.7
The constitution does not define "basic health
services".8 Does the term refer only to a fixed set
of primary health care services made available for
all children, or does it include health care for chil-
dren with special needs which may be relatively
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rare and costly to treat but which are nevertheless
basic in the sense of being necessary for survival
and adequate functioning? Without entering this
debate, we assume public policy seeks to give con-
tent to children's constitutional right to "basic
health services" by setting and implementing pri-
orities beyond the bare minimum of essential pri-
mary health care.
Public policy implementation
The government has already taken several practi-
cal steps, beginning with the introduction of free
health care for all children under six and pregnant
women.9 Subsequently, children's access to health
care improved considerably, particularly among
traditionally marginalised groups, such as chil-
dren living in rural areas, informal settlements,
and on white-owned farms.9 However, insufficient
numbers of primary health care facilities, and
inadequate transport services, remain significant
barriers to health care for many children. The
government has embarked on a massive pro-
gramme to upgrade clinics. The introduction, in
April 1996, of the first stage of a national health
service, with a strong public health dimension,
broadened children's health care access still
further. The government aims to provide an
essential primary health care package which will
be community-based and universally available.'"
Although the exact nature of the package has to be
finalised, it is certain to include preventive and
promotive care (for example, immunisation and
growth monitoring), the management of common
childhood illnesses such as diarrhoeal disease, and
limited care for children with chronic disease and
acute mental-health conditions."
Not all ill health is amenable to prevention and
acute management, and many children with
chronic disease and disability require long term
interventions. Although much of health care man-
agement and rehabilitation for all children will be
delivered at community level," there are still many
who will need specialised, often costly, care.'2
These numbers will very likely increase as primary
health care services detect children with previ-
ously undiagnosed chronic conditions and refer
them for specialist care. Much uncertainty
surrounds the future of specialist services, which
will carry this increasing burden, since the
Department of Health is committed to redistrib-
uting resources between all levels of care and away
from tertiary care."
Tensions in public policy implementation
Any attempt to define a rational health care policy
by setting priorities for the macro-allocation of
children's health care resources would have to
contend with formidable tensions, given scarcity
and egalitarianism defined in terms of equal con-
stitutional rights-claims to "basic health services"
which we assume reach beyond the bare minimum
of health care to include specialised (but basic)
health care for children with special needs. We
illustrate five of these overlapping tensions.
TENSION 1: EQUALITY VERSUS MAXIMISING OVERALL
WELLBEING
The first is the fundamental normative tension
between two basic moral values which typically
underlie distributive choices, namely, equality and
wellbeing. Let us assume the constitutional guar-
antee of equal health care rights for children has as
its underlying rationale that children should have
equal basic opportunities to flourish fully as
human beings by having, as far as possible, their
different potentials developed to the full. Let us
call this a commitment to "equality of basic
opportunities", or "equality" for short. If we also
assume it is rational to use scarce resources in
such a way that they generate the most overall
benefit or the greatest overall wellbeing, in the
form of extension of life or improvement of qual-
ity of life, then we may have two conflicting com-
mitments. On the one hand, equality requires that
children have access to all those formative
material conditions, such as health care, necessary
for developing their potential. On the other, health
care promotes wellbeing, and it is rational to strive
towards achieving the most beneficial overall out-
come, given scarce resources. But maximising
overall or total beneficial outcome pulls against the
demands of justice as equality of individual basic
opportunities.
Put differently: given scarce resources, setting
priorities based solely or predominantly on the
ideal of equality would seem to require employing
all resources in combating the most severe
disability and disease so that every child would
have at least some chance to develop his or her
potential, and this could mean poor use of
resources in terms of overall beneficial outcome,
pouring them into the proverbial bottomless pit.
However, given scarce resources, setting priorities
based solely or predominantly on maximising
overall wellbeing might require abandoning some
children, for example, denying disabled children a
fair chance of getting care since their special needs
would result in their receiving less benefit from the
same treatment than otherwise similar children
without those special needs,"4 thus compromising
the best overall outcome.
Finding a balance between equality of basic
opportunities and producing the best overall out-
come raises the question about the role, if any,
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cost-benefit or cost-effective'5 analysis should play
in the moral evaluation of health care on a macro
level. Scales of effective outcomes based on such
measurements as the quality adjusted life year
(QALY) or quality of wellbeing (QWB),'6 or the
more recently developed disability adjusted life
year (DALY),'6 '7 are typically employed in
maximising cost-benefit analyses which would
either contradict, or only contingently promote,
equality of basic opportunities." 1 18 19 Moreover,
the shortcomings of the cost-effectiveness ap-
proach in health care planning in South Africa are
well described."
In sum, equality is a constitutionally mandated
ideal and realising that ideal might require not
using health care resources in ways that deliver the
most overall benefit. But it is rational to use
limited health care resources in ways that produce
more rather than less good for everyone affected
by macro-allocation decisions, which might be
inconsistent with creating equal basic opportuni-
ties for everyone.
TENSION 2: LOW-COST VERSUS HIGH-COST HEALTH
CARE
There probably is universal agreement that basic
primary health care for children should be a first
priority, and government actions have been
consistent with this view. However, given the
realities of need and scarce resources, and the
commitment to equality of basic opportunities,
there is inevitable tension between providing
primary health care, and providing health care for
children who require more resources, for example,
the chronically ill. Hard priority-setting choices
have to be made because not all children can
receive all advanced health care, given scarce
resources, even if this care is "basic" in the sense
of being necessary for survival or adequate
functioning.
Identifying advanced health care services which
should be included in a public health care package
for children, primary health care and prevention
having been secured, involves a tension between
low-cost and high-cost health care, which largely
overlaps with the tension between basic primary
health care and more advanced health care.'8 19
Cost is a complex concept which embraces, for
example, individual and social cost, material and
emotional cost, and real and opportunity cost.
Moreover, cost has to be weighted or balanced
against other morally relevant factual considera-
tions, such as, severity of disease, individual effec-
tive outcome, social benefit, or numbers. For
example, assuming that we can determine cost,
should we give priority to cheaper treatment,
potentially providing small benefits to many chil-
dren, or to more expensive treatment, potentially
providing large benefits to a few children, for the
same overall expense?20
Arguably, weighting cost against other morally
relevant variables does not mean that, in general,
no health care resources should be channelled
towards individual high-cost/high-benefit treat-
ments of smaller numbers. Doing this might, in
particular cases, be the best way to promote
equality of basic opportunities, even in circum-
stances of great scarcity in South Africa. Treat-
ment of a relatively small number of children for
chronic diseases, such as cystic fibrosis and
cancer, is expensive, but it may be justified when
cost is weighted against other morally relevant
factors.
TENSION 3: HEALTH CARE FOR THE WORSE OFF
VERSUS THE BETTER OFF
Diseases vary in severity, some children being
worse off than others. Children with greater
impairment of function have greater health care
needs. The degrees of importance of different
health care needs are measured in terms of the
relative seriousness of those needs and "the harm-
fulness of their medical condition if left
untreated".2' There are different ways in which
children can be worse off. Individual diseases have
different degrees of severity. Particular diseases
may be more severe in different children. Some
children suffer from multiple diseases. Others
have life-threatening diseases. And there are chil-
dren with serious diseases which are irreversible if
left untreated.
How should the commitment to equality of
basic opportunities accommodate the tension
introduced by variations in severity of disease or
extremity of health care need? Should children
who are substantially worse off than others as a
result of their disease, and who therefore have a
greater need for treatment, enjoy greater priority
in comparison with those less seriously ill, even
when a cost-benefit analysis establishes that treat-
ing the less severely ill child is more
cost-effective?20 There is a widespread social con-
viction that a worse-off individual has a moral
claim to relatively more health-care resources than
a better-off individual, but this conviction is, on
the face of it, incompatible with cost-effective
analysis which is biased towards services that
maximise effective overall treatment outcomes
while minimising overall costs.'6
What priority should be given to worse-off
children,20 and exactly how should severity of dis-
ease be weighted against other morally relevant
considerations, such as beneficial outcome and
cost? These questions cannot be answered in the
Landman, Henley 271
abstract, but it would seem more plausible to give
weighted, rather than absolute, priority to the
worse off in resource allocation,20 otherwise it
would be like pouring resources into a bottomless
pit.
TENSION 4: HEALTH CARE FOR LARGER VERSUS
SMALLER NUMBERS
Some diseases affect larger numbers of children
than others, but do numbers count morally? Is the
prevalence of a disease a morally relevant consid-
eration in priority setting for children in view of
the requirements of equality? Maximising utilitar-
ians would deal with the tension between provid-
ing health care resources to the many or to the few
by setting common conditions as a high priority
while giving rare conditions a low priority, unless
doing so would adversely affect overall benefit or
utility. Primary health care and prevention, which
reach large numbers of children, need little
argument,"7 and there is a widely held social con-
viction that society should give a higher priority to
diseases with a higher prevalence.
Does it follow from this conviction that higher
numbers by themselves should count morally, given
a moral analysis that accepts equality of basic
opportunities as a primary value? Some suggest
that "it is not the prevalence of the disorder that
makes it a high priority treatment but a host of
other considerations, including effectiveness of
outcomes and costs".22 Consider an example with
two diseases, the one high-prevalence and the
other low-prevalence. Other things, such as cost,
being equal, refusal to treat the latter, while treat-
ing the common condition, would be an "irra-
tional bias against people and problems that come
in small groups".22 Moreover, giving greater num-
bers as such priority over smaller numbers would
seem to contradict the requirements of equality of
basic opportunities. From this it would follow that
numbers by themselves would be an inappropriate
consideration in setting priorities for children's
health care.
Some might none the less argue that numbers
should count by themselves in this kind of exam-
ple. If other things are indeed equal in the sense
that other variables are constant, while only num-
bers differ, what other than numbers could possi-
bly be the basis for a rational or non-random deci-
sion? It could be argued, for example, that if
resources are so scarce that a choice must be made
between funding a cure for AIDS and a cure for
some very rare disease which is in every respect
(symptoms, prognosis, communicability, etc),
other than underlying physiological cause, the
same as AIDS, then it would be more rational to
be guided by numbers alone rather than by
random selection or a lottery. But this choice is
largely hypothetical, because in practice other
morally relevant factors would most likely enter
into the balancing process.
Consider an example which differs from the
first in that treatment for the low-prevalence
disease costs substantially more per individual
than for the high-prevalence disease. Here it does
seem intuitively correct to give higher priority to
the high-prevalence group of children. In this
regard, it has been recommended that "(p)reva-
lence should be a relevant public consideration
only when, for example, a decision must be made
whether to treat a rare, harmful disorder at such
great cost that it stands to squeeze out treatment
of a common and less harmful disorder".23 Why
would this be so? Benefit to the many by itself does
not outweigh benefit to the few, but priority
depends on other morally relevant variables, such
as cost, as well. Numbers might appear to be
overriding, but in setting priorities other morally
relevant facts have to be balanced or weighted in
pursuit of equality of basic opportunities.
Public-policy decisions about setting priorities
(ranking) for macro-allocation need to take
rational account of these four tensions. But who
should make these decisions, and how? If ranking
decisions follow a democratic process, new
tensions are likely to arise between democratic
decision making and popular prejudices against
vulnerable groups of children, and between differ-
ent social values which have to be balanced in the
process.
TENSION 5: DEMOCRATIC DECISION MAKING,
POPULAR PREJUDICES AND CONFLICTING SOCIAL
VALUES
In South Africa, because of its history of excluding
the majority from decision making and its policies
of unjust discrimination and oppression, there is
an even greater need than in stable democracies to
show that any process of distribution of resources
is legitimate by being open and susceptible to
critical correction by wide public participation in
decision making.24 To this end, the government
supports community involvement in planning
health services.'" Moreover, the government has a
duty, as a signatory to the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, to consult
with children on all matters affecting their
wellbeing5 and this could, arguably, include
setting priorities for their own health care.
As in many societies, however, popular preju-
dices against certain groups of children, such as
the mentally disabled and those with HIV/AIDS,
mean that wide public participation is no guaran-
tee that priority-setting decisions would not be
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arbitrary and unjust. There are two possible
responses. First, one could build mechanisms into
the democratic decision-making process to cor-
rect the most blatant forms of prejudice. For
example, public-policy decision-makers should
not simply mirror popular sentiments, but should
be sensitive articulators and active protectors of
the health care needs of all, including the most
vulnerable. Other initiatives might include a min-
ister for children in the cabinet and a statutory
children's rights commissioner25 to monitor com-
pliance with the principles of the convention.
Second, public prejudice can, ultimately, only
be combated by community education to remove
the causes of bias. Community education pro-
grammes, combined with community delibera-
tion, could "both help people see vividly the con-
sequences of their decisions on the lives of real
people and instruct them about relevant facts".26
Democratic decision-making about resource
distribution also has to contend with tensions
involving different social values, and therefore
tragic choices.27 This is illustrated by a South
African study which underscores deep value
differences between physicians and nurses in a
neonatal intensive care unit, and mothers of
recently discharged survivors.28 Most mothers did
not condone cessation of treatment under any cir-
cumstances, and approximately 40% rejected any
notion of finite resources. In contrast, the medical
team, acutely aware of economic constraints and
the potential burden of severe handicap on
families and society, exhibited strong utilitarian
(cost-effective) attitudes to resource allocation.
Here we have a conflict between judgments about
the value of a human life and the social utility
value of apportioning resources. We are forced to
make a tragic choice between individual human
life and the overall good, or to put a price on life.
A national forum
Since these tensions make rational priority-setting
so intractable, how, in practice, should the
government take forward the transformation of
children's health care?
In line with the suggestion that South Africa
adopts "a deliberate government strategy to foster
public involvement in determining health priori-
ties and interventions" 29 we recommend the gov-
ernment appoints a representative body linked, for
example, to the proposed National Health Con-
sultative Forum,30 to generate and review priority-
setting policies for the just macro-allocation of
health care resources, whilst recognising the
special moral claims of children to health care. It
should have real powers and wide representation,
including lay people, experts in various fields (giv-
ing technical advice and ethical guidance), and
people who have the necessary social standing to
gauge public opinion on national, regional, and
local levels. The outcome must be the evolution-
ary development of priority-setting guidelines and
policy choices for the basic but specialised health
care of children, complementing the essential pri-
mary health care package now being developed.
Conclusion
Enormous social and economic problems in post-
apartheid South Africa seriously limit the claims
health care can justly make on total societal
resources. The government has responded by
shifting priorities to primary health care and
implementing stringent cost containment meas-
ures. Simultaneously, it is morally and constitu-
tionally bound to provide "basic health services",
the definition of which will be crucial, for all chil-
dren under 18. Given scarce resources and a com-
mitment to greater equality in the distribution of
health care, a number of formidable, and possibly
irresolvable, tensions will arise, mainly between
equality of basic opportunities and achieving the
most beneficial overall outcome. Other tensions
will be created by factors such as treatment cost,
and severity and prevalence of disease. Demo-
cratic decision-making, as a method of resource
allocation, creates its own tensions. Our objective
was not to resolve these tensions, but to stimulate
public debate on the ethical issues surrounding
priority-setting in children's health care in South
Africa, the absence of which will perpetuate the
status quo distribution by default.
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